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DLD-297        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-1917 
 ___________ 
 
 LARRY HICKMAN, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 KENNETH CAMERON,  
 Warden of SCI-Cresson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2:11-cv-00791) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit 
 L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 and on Appellant’s Request for a 
 Certificate of Appealability Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) 
June 27, 2013 
 
 Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: July 23, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Larry Hickman appeals an order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for 
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relief from judgment.  The order also imposed a filing injunction.  For the following 
reasons, we will deny a certificate of appealability (COA) to the extent one is necessary 
and otherwise affirm the District Court’s ruling, albeit with modifications to the 
injunction. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we need not recount the long history of 
Hickman’s collateral attacks on his 1988 Allegheny County conviction.  See generally 
Hickman v. Coleman, No. 10–148, 2010 WL 2634104 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2010), adopted 
by 2010 WL 2634006 (W.D. Pa. June 30, 2010).  Suffice it to say, both we and the 
District Court have long held that Hickman has exhausted his ―one bite of the apple under 
the AEDPA,‖ Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 512 (3d Cir. 1997).  See, e.g., 
Hickman v. Cameron, C.A. No. 11-4118 (order entered Jan. 11, 2012).   
Hickman’s most recent effort was filed in March 2013.  Purportedly a Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 60(b) motion, it averred that the District Court’s order denying his 1996 habeas corpus 
petition was void for lack of jurisdiction on account of a ―plain usurpation of judicial 
power.‖  It also appeared to attack the resolution of prior post-judgment motions.   
The District Court denied 60(b) relief ―[f]or the same reasons set forth in [its] 
previous order.‖  And because the District Court had previously ―warned [Hickman] that 
his actions in presenting this Court with patently frivolous petitions exposed him to the 
possibility of sanctions,‖ a filing injunction was imposed, reading: 
Petitioner, Larry Hickman, is HEREBY PROHIBITED from filing any 
habeas corpus proceeding, or motion in connection therewith, in this Court. 
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Should Petitioner attempt to file any such petition or motion, the Court will 
order that he be required to pay $1000.00 in sanctions that will be deducted 
in monthly installments from his inmate trust fund account.   
Hickman timely appealed, and he has applied for a COA. 
 The District Court’s order has two separate parts, each requiring different 
treatment.  To appeal the District Court’s disposition of the Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, 
Hickman is required to obtain a COA.  See Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 
1999); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).  The District Court declined to issue one.  See 
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 11(a).  And, for substantially the same reasons 
discussed by the District Court, we conclude that jurists would not debate its decision to 
deny relief.  See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).  Thus, Hickman’s 
application for a COA is denied. 
 By contrast, the filing injunction is not connected with the merits of the underlying 
habeas corpus proceeding.  Hence, no COA is required to appeal it.  See Harbison v. Bell, 
556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009).  We thus exercise our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to 
determine whether the injunction represents an abuse of discretion.  In re Packer Ave. 
Associates, 884 F.2d 745, 747 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 In In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1982), we wrote: 
It is well within the broad scope of the All Writs Act for a district court to 
issue an order restricting the filing of meritless cases by a litigant whose 
manifold complaints raise claims identical or similar to those that already 
have been adjudicated.  The interests of repose, finality of judgments, 
protection of defendants from unwarranted harassment, and concern for 
maintaining order in the court’s dockets have been deemed sufficient by a 
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number of courts to warrant such a prohibition against relitigation of 
claims. 
Id. at 445.  Such a sanction ―should not be imposed by a court without prior notice and 
some occasion to respond.‖  Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(per curiam); accord United States v. Robinson, 251 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2001) (per 
curiam); see also Oliver, 682 F.2d at 445 (describing a filing injunction as ―an extreme 
remedy‖).   
 Here, the District Court clearly gave Hickman prior warning that continuing to 
submit frivolous filings, in light of his extensive history of doing so, would expose him to 
the possibility of sanctions.  See Mem. Order 1 n.1, ECF No. 9.  We conclude that he was 
properly apprised of the risks he faced and has had an opportunity to explain himself.  No 
abuse of discretion is apparent. 
 However, we are concerned that the District Court’s order may be somewhat 
overbroad.  By its plain language, it prevents Hickman from filing ―any habeas corpus 
proceeding.‖  The well has run dry for collateral attacks on the 1988 conviction, but the 
District Court’s language could arguably bar a valid collateral attack on a future 
conviction, or otherwise prevent a different, legitimate exercise of the writ.  See In re 
Packer Ave. Associates, 884 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 1989) (discussing filing injunction 
that ―appear[ed] to prohibit appellant from ever again filing another petition, pleading or 
document in federal court‖).  ―All of the courts that have considered whether an 
injunction restricting a litigant’s future litigation may be issued have emphasized that 
 5 
 
such an injunction should be narrowly tailored . . . .‖  Id.  Further, the automatic 
imposition of a $1000 fine, without any additional process, may contravene Hickman’s 
rights.  Cf. Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
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In Packer, we endeavored to ―strike[] a good balance between the right of the 
litigant to access . . . the courts, the right of parties to previous litigation to enjoy the 
repose of res judicata, and the right of taxpayers not to have a frivolous litigant become 
an unwarranted drain on their resources.‖  Packer, 884 F.2d at 748.  We will follow 
Packer’s approach (as modified by the intervening passage of AEDPA), and amend the 
District Court’s injunction to read as follows: 
Petitioner, Larry Hickman, is HEREBY PROHIBITED from filing any 
habeas corpus proceeding, or motion in connection therewith, relating to his 
1988 criminal conviction in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny 
County, Pennsylvania, in this Court without first seeking leave to do so.  In 
seeking leave, Hickman must certify that the claims he wishes to present 
are not barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s 
prohibition on successive filings; or, in the case of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) 
motion, that his motion presents a new, nonfrivolous reason for granting 
relief from judgment.  Upon a failure to certify or upon a false certification, 
Hickman may be found in contempt of court and punished accordingly.  
Such punishment may include fines and other penalties that the Court 
deems proper.  
We will otherwise summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment, as this appeal 
presents no substantial question.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 
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 Fines themselves, however, are permissible—if uncommon—in the habeas context.  See 
Smith v. Gilmore, 111 F.3d 55, 56 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). 
 
 6 
 
2011) (per curiam); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
2
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 Of course, a district court has significant discretion in managing the cases on its docket.  
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982).  Today’s decision 
should not be read to bar the imposition of a more-restrictive (or additional) filing 
injunction should Hickman’s filing pattern continue unabated.   
 
Because our amended order eliminates the automatic filing sanction, we need not 
determine at this time whether a District Court may permissibly target an inmate’s prison 
account for deduction as part of imposing monetary sanctions.  But see Alexander v. 
United States, 121 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 1997) (suggesting, in 28 U.S.C. § 2255-
derived proceedings, that ―tapping the prisoner’s trust account under the PLRA is not an 
option‖ because the PLRA ―does not apply to collateral attacks on criminal convictions‖); 
Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 756 (3d Cir. 1996).  
 
